SUMMARY
The Polkadot runtime upgrade to v1.1.2 introduced an unintentional breaking change that prevented three staking accounts from receiving staking rewards across multiple eras. This proposal seeks to reimburse these accounts for the rewards they should have earned for backing validators and securing the network.
The process was detailed by core developer gpestana in multiple articles compiled in the following Polkadot Forum post:
Recover corrupted Staking ledgers in Polkadot and Kusama
The referendum could not be proposed until the runtime upgrade to v1.4.0, which corrected the balance state of one of the affected accounts (PR 538).
TIMELINE
PROPOSAL DETAILS
Each account faced a unique situation, and the analysis took into account the bonded funds at the time rewards ceased, the number of eras the payee account went without receiving rewards, and the average APY during that period.
Below is the information for each affected account:
Affected account: 138fZsNu67JFtiiWc1eWK2Ev5jCYT6ZirZM288tf99CUHk8K
Affected account: 15bt67qghz8hJxCUPgAXmzVxUBHLpPN41RVm2nwMFyLWByVE
Affected account: 12gmcL9eej9jRBFT26vZLF4b7aAe4P9aEYHGHFzJdmf5arPi
SUMMARY
The Polkadot runtime upgrade to v1.1.2 introduced an unintentional breaking change that prevented three staking accounts from receiving staking rewards across multiple eras. This proposal seeks to reimburse these accounts for the rewards they should have earned for backing validators and securing the network.
The process was detailed by core developer gpestana in multiple articles compiled in the following Polkadot Forum post:
Recover corrupted Staking ledgers in Polkadot and Kusama
The referendum could not be proposed until the runtime upgrade to v1.4.0, which corrected the balance state of one of the affected accounts (PR 538).
TIMELINE
PROPOSAL DETAILS
Each account faced a unique situation, and the analysis took into account the bonded funds at the time rewards ceased, the number of eras the payee account went without receiving rewards, and the average APY during that period.
Below is the information for each affected account:
Affected account: 138fZsNu67JFtiiWc1eWK2Ev5jCYT6ZirZM288tf99CUHk8K
Affected account: 15bt67qghz8hJxCUPgAXmzVxUBHLpPN41RVm2nwMFyLWByVE
Affected account: 12gmcL9eej9jRBFT26vZLF4b7aAe4P9aEYHGHFzJdmf5arPi
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